Science and the Practical Institutions by Krohn, Roger G.
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science 
Volume 28 Number 1 Article 25 
1960 
Science and the Practical Institutions 
Roger G. Krohn 
University of Newfoundland, St. John's 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas 
 Part of the Sociology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Krohn, R. G. (1960). Science and the Practical Institutions. Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science, 
Vol. 28 No.1, 163-172. 
Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas/vol28/iss1/25 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Minnesota Morris Digital 
Well. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science by an authorized editor of 
University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. For more information, please contact skulann@morris.umn.edu. 
SOCIOLOGY 
SCIENCE AND THE PRACTICAL INSTITUTIONS* 
ROGER G. KROHN 
University of Newfoundland, St. John's 
The transformation of modern society under the creative forces 
of science has often been studied. Until recently the return implica-
tions of social changes on science have not been subject to equal 
scrutiny. Contemporary observers from within as well as from outside 
the scientific community have noted that the social basis of science is 
undergoing a rapid and profound transformation. 
These writers feel that the attempt to harness the modern scientific 
cornucopia to the requirements of a military-industrial civilization 
may end by robbing the horn of its magical productivity. Merle Tuve, 
for example, is alarmed because the professor's life "is becoming a 
rat race of business and activity," while basic research is being ig-
nored. Scientific activity has increasingly come to be equated with 
large-scale team projects and technical instrumentation. Science itself 
has come to be increasingly justified only on the basis of its ultimate 
utility. In face of this, Tuve makes a strong plea for the substantial 
support of "academic research, the intensely personal activity of in-
dividual professional workers" . . . as an investment of some of our 
"excess social energy in science and the arts for their own sake" 
(Tuve, 1959:169-184). 
C. Wright Mills makes a similar point from a somewhat broader 
perspective (Mills, 1956: 142-156). In the course of his discussion 
of the contemporary position of the scientist as well as other types 
of intellectuals, he points out that whereas in the past the intellectual 
was the independent critic of his society and its institutions and the 
creator of higher cultural values and knowledge, he now becomes the 
servant of institutions as technician and as ideologist. He thus be-
comes incapable either of criticism or independent creativity. 
William H. Whyte, also concerned about the contemporary condi-
tion of science, begins his discussion with the general observation that 
the development of large-scale organizations is the occasion of a pro-
found change in the traditional Euro-American Protestant mentality 
(Whyte, 1957). He calls this the change from the Protestant Ethic 
to the Social Ethic. The application of the Social Ethic to science means, 
1. that there is an overwhelming concentration of effort in applied re-
search at the expense of basic research, 2. that team work predomi-
• The first hand material on which the present study is based was collected during the 
winter of 1960. The materials were gathered through personal interview. 
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nates over individual effort, 3. that organizational loyalty and socia-
bility are considered as valuable as thinking, and 4. that the brilliant 
man is beginning to be seen as essentially disruptive (Ibid., 225). 
American students are not alone in making observations on the 
impact of society on science. Essentially the same point has been 
made, with one critical difference, by J. D. Bernal in England. He 
maintains that in its very structure, "The scientific organization of 
today is not limited to, and is in fact not mainly concerned with, the 
internal development of science" (Bernal, 1956:894). The danger to 
free science is due to its increasing absorption into the laboratories of 
the practical institutions of government, industry, and medicine. Even 
the university laboratories are increasingly supported and conse-
quently controlled by government and industry. In his view it is para-
doxically true that, although the growth of science measured by the 
amount of money spent and personnel employed has been phenom-
enal, it has actually limited the advance of basic or fundamental 
science, because "it has been at the expense of very serious distortion 
of aim and method" (Bernal, 1956: 896-898). Bernal's analysis goes 
beyond the other writers cited in that he makes a critical distinction 
between the process of institutionalization per se, and the attachment 
of science to, or the support of science by, the practical institutions 
of society. It is the latter to which he attributes central importance in 
the changing patterns of science and which causes "the distortion of 
aim and method." This distinction is central to the present argument. 
The increasing size of the research establishment and conducting re-
search by organized teams alone are not solely responsible for the 
changes in science seen and feared by many. Although the sheer 
dimensions of research and the consequent necessity for formal or-
ganization certainly must be held as accountable factors, a more fun-
damental and in the long range more important one is the absorption 
of science into applied institutions and its application to their parti-
cular purposes. In other words, the traditional conception of the 
nature of science and the role of the scientist are linked as importantly 
to the value of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake as they are 
to research by individuals working independently. 
The effort here will be to reduce the general notions of these 
writers to theoretically precise and measurable dimensions. It is felt 
that these observations are directed to changes that are actually oc-
curring in three separate, although related ways. First, there is a 
change from the justification of research by the value of knowledge 
for its own sake to its justification by the value of utility. Second, in 
place of the traditional conception of the scientist as an intellectual 
there is the tendency to assimilate him to the general type of the 
professional. Third, rather than the conception that research is prop-
erly conducted by individuals there is the model of the large scale 
formally organized research project. The actual occurrence and extent 
of the changes on these three dimensions will be tested by eight scales 
developed for this purpose. Before going into this test a few comments 
on the historical development of science will be useful for supplying 
a general perspective. 
164 
PROCEEDINGS, VOLUME TWENTY-EIGHT, 1960 
Some Social Factors in the History of Science: Without going into 
detail it }Ilay be said that the modern scientist arose as a dilettantish 
amateur and only became converted in time into a salaried and insti.-
tutionally anchored professional. In the 15th and 16th centuries he 
was either self-supported or was supported by a patron whose fancy 
he somehow touched. For example, Galileo was first a university pro-
fessor and later was supported and protected by the Duke of Tuscany; 
Copernicus was a curate and medical practitioner; Kepler was an 
astrologist; and Tycho Brahe was given an estate at Uraniborg by 
Frederick II of Denmark. 
In the 17th century, when science underwent a particularly vigor-
ous development in England and France, it was supported by the . 
newly wealthy bourgeoisie, who were in a financial position to indulge 
their fancy for science. This was true, for example, of Boyle and 
Huygens. 
The academic phase was entered in France in the 18th century, in 
Germany in the early part of the 19th, and in England and America 
in the latter part of the 19th century when science became established 
in the universities. 
In the academy the pattern of attitudes, values and activity, de-
scribed as "natural philosophy" took the stable form that has come 
to be characteristic of our conception of what science and the scientist 
are. One central factor behind this complex of ideas is the fact that 
science was the enterprise of individuals who undertook their scien-
tific activities for their private purposes, whether it be called the satis-
faction of curiosity, love of truth, or the attempt to understand the 
natural world. Related to science as an individual enterprise was the 
conception that personal freedom was an essential condition for its 
successful prosecution. Another conception which grew out of the 
individualistic character of scientific activity was that the source of 
creativity was the individual personality. This conception was crystal-
ized in the application to science of the 19th century romantic con-
ception of the "genius." 
The other central factor in the developing conception of science 
was that science became heir to the traditional values of the academy. 
First in importance here is the definition of the new investigations, as 
"natural philosophy." Hence, science became part of the world of 
knowledge and of value as an end in itself, and the scientist was a 
scholar who engaged in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. 
Lastly, there was the conception of knowledge, whether it be called 
laws, principles, or, later, theory, as the end of intellectual effort, and 
the method of proof or demonstration as only a means to that end and 
strictly subordinate to it. 
At the end of the 19th century, science became relevant to the 
larger affairs of life on a large scale, such as industrial, military, and 
medical technology. Therefore, it began to be pursued explicitly and 
directly for these purposes under the auspices of the respective insti-
tutions. In the 20th century substantial scientific enterprises have 
been incorporated into, and built or supported by the industrial, gov-
ernmental, and medical institutions. 
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The Case of the Medical School, Applied Science in an Academic 
Institution: The thesis of this paper is that the writers cited above are 
correct in their perceptions of the changes in contemporary science 
and the scientific role. These changes are undoubtedly related to large 
team projects and to extensive technology, and they may well be 
partly due to the social ethic that accompanies large scale organization 
or to the tendency of intellectuals to serve and not criticize the insti-
tutions that employ them. However, all of these observations are seen 
here as aspects of the effect of the attachment of scientific research to 
the practical institutions of society. 
Inasmuch as the university contains both basic research, directed 
to knowledge for its own sake, and applied science, directed to the 
solution of particular types of practical problems, in a situation in 
which both are pursued by autonomous scholars working indepen-
dently, it offers an ideal opportunity to test for a difference in the 
conception of science and the scientific role in these respective condi-
tions. 
For example, in a medical school science remains the enterprise of 
autonomous scholars working independently with free choice in the 
research they will or will not do. At the same time its situation is 
different from that in the College of Science, Literature, and the Arts 
because it is in an institution explicitly founded for another purpose, 
the treatment of human ills and the teaching of the healing arts. In 
short, in a medical school academic conditions prevail for research 
save that it is applied to other specific human ends. 
To test the hypothesis, data, are taken from a study of scientists 
in the Twin City area. The study includes seventy-one scientists from 
the University of Minnesota, twenty-six from the College of Science, 
Literature, and the Arts in the physical and biological sciences, and 
forty-five from the Medical School. Those in the Medical School are 
divided into two groups, twenty-five in the basic medical sciences; 
anatomy, bacteriology, microbiology, physiological chemistry, and 
physiology, and twenty from all twelve of the clinical departments. 
Comparisons can therefore be made between three groups; one of 
basic scientists in the Science, Literature, and Arts College, and two 
in the Medical School, one of basic and the other of clinical medical 
scientists. 
These scientists were interviewed to obtain information on the 
origins of their interests in science, on their educational and occupa-
tional history and experience, on their attitudes toward science, and 
on their conception of the scientific role. As far as possible, the indi-
viduals were selected on a random basis. The very excellent coopera-
tion, with a few minor exceptions, resulted in a random selection of 
the individuals within the two sections of the University. The attitudes 
of the scientists were compared on the basis of their scores on the 
eight scales listed as follows: 
A. On the Conception of Science. 
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TABLE 1. A Comparison of the Scale Scores of Three Groups of University Scientists 
On the Nature On the Conception of On the Organization 
of Science the Scientific Role of Research 
Knowledge- Theory- Personality- Intellectual- Priv.-Org'l. Priv.-Org'l. Individual- Freedom 
Utility Method Situation Professional Motive, Ab't. Motive, Per'!. Team Bureaucracy Totals 
1. S.L.A. 2.08 2.91 2.49 2.49 
2. M.B. 2.16 3.43 3.10 2.52 
3. M.C. 2.65 3.20 2.76 2.74 
4. M.B.+M.C. 2.42 3.31 2.91 2.64 
Diff. ( 4-1) .34 .40 .42 .15 
Significance 
Level ,05T .05 .05 .25 
Abbreviations: S.L.A.-College of Science, Literature, and Arts scientists. 
M.B.-Medical School, basic scientists. 
M.C.-Medical School, clinical scientists. 
2.96 2.32 2.05 2.23 2.44 
2.40 2.51 2.98 2.53 2.61 
2.70 2.40 2.87 2.91 2.69 
2.57 2.44 2.92 2.74 2.66 
-.39 .14 .87 .51 .31* 
-.05 .25 .01 .01 
*l. Note: This is the average of the differences rather than the average 
difference. · 
N .B. The lower the score the closer the group is to the traditional values 
of science. 
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2. Theory-Method Scale. A measure of the degree to which essential 
importance in the research process is attributed to creative thought 
or to rigorous methodology and advanced technology. 
3. Personality-Situation Scale. A measure of whether discovery is at-
tributed to the creative personality or to appropriate research con-
ditions. 
B. On the Nature of the Scientific Role: 
4. Intellectual-Professional Scale. A measure of whether the scientific 
role is seen to be essentially that of independent intellectual pursuit 
or that of a professional employed for his skills and knowledge. 
5. Private-Organizational Motive, Abstract Scale. A measure of the 
degree to which scientific work is seen to be the result of purely 
private motives (curiosity, etc.) or to be the result of working for 
satisfactions that are organizationally mediated (salary, prestige, etc.) 
6. The Private-Organizational Motive, Personal Scale. A measure of 
the degree to which the scientist evaluates his job as an oppor-
tunity to gain private satisfactions, (learning, freedom, curiosity, 
etc.), or as an opportunity to gain organizationally mediated satis-
factions, (salary. promotion, prestige, etc.) 
C. On the Appropriate Organization for Scientific Research: 
7. Individual-Team Scale. A measure of the degree to which the most 
productive unit for the organization of research is considered to be 
the individual investigator or the organized research team. 
8. Freedom-Bureaucracy Scale. A measure of the degree to which the 
most important quality of the administration of research is consid-
ered to be freedom for the individual or efficiency for the organiza-
tion. 
In each case the traditional value is mentioned first and the organi-
zational value second. A low score indicates a position close to the 
traditional value. 
SLA and the Medical School -A Comparison of Scientific Atti-
tudes and Values: The Medical School scientists had higher scale 
scores, i.e. were further from the traditional attitudes and values of 
academic science, than the SLA scientists on seven of the eight scales. 
On five of these seven scales the difference was significant at the .05 
confidence level. ( See Table 1 ) On the eighth scale, the Private-
Organizational Motive, Abstract, Scale the difference between the two 
groups was significant but the order was reversed. The medical scien-
tists place more importance on the general operation of private (in-
tellectual) satisfaction as motives for scientific work than the SLA 
scientists. It is not known whether the reversal of scores on this scale 
is due to the items or is touching on an actual difference in the atti-
tudes between the two groups of scientists. Whatever the explanation 
for the negative evidence of the P-O, Abstract, Scale the stronger evi-
dence of the other seven scales must be taken to support the hypothesis. 
The Basic Medical Scientists-Holders of the Middle Ground: 
The scores of the basic medical scientists show that they did not uni-
formly hold positions, along with their fellows in clinical medicine, nor 
did they regularly fall in between them and the SLA scientists. On 
three key scales they hold the traditional values of science along with 
the physical and biological scientists. On all three scales the differ-
ence between the scores of the basic medical and the clinical medical 
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scientist is statistically significant at the .01 confidence level. They 
have low scores on the Knowledge-Utility Scale, meaning they tend 
to justify science by the value of knowledge rather than by that of 
utility. They also have low scores on the Intellectual-Professional 
Scale, meaning they tend to have an intellectual rather than a profes-
sional conception of the scientific role. And they have low scores on 
the Freedom-Bureaucracy Scale, meaning they tend to prefer freedom 
over efficiency in the organization of research projects. Noting also 
that the basic medical scientists put the most importance of any group 
on private intellectual motives for scientists in general, on the 
Private-Organizational Motive, Abstract, Scale, it appears that they 
have taken a firm position of the side of traditional scientific values on 
all the scales that touch most directly on value dimensions. 
However, the basic medical scientists have taken positions along 
with the clinicians, or even beyond them, toward the practicality end 
of all four of the other scales. While the first three of the scales men-
tioned above deal with central academic values, the latter scales deal 
with issues that emerge from everyday decisions of working scientists. 
Preferring to work alone or with others (Individual-Team Scale) may 
arise from considerations of the size and complexity of the problems 
involved. The· evaluation of the relative importance of methodology 
and technique as opposed to theoreticalissues (Theory-Method Scale) 
in the research process may be understood as a matter of opinion 
based on one's own experience. The complex of private and organiza-
tional values measured by the Private-Organizational Motive, Per-
sonal, Scale was perhaps of too unclear value significance for a firm 
position to be taken. 
Thus the basic medical scientists are found in a middle ground, 
possibly in a state of tension. On the one hand they are firmly an-
chored in academic values, and on the other they are responding to 
the situation of working within an applied institution, the Medical 
School, at least partly on applied medical problems. 
The S.L.A. and the Medical School Scientists Compared on Spe-
cific Issues: Returning to the main theme of this paper, the general 
differences between the scientists in Science, Literature, and the Arts 
and those in the Medical School can be supplemented and illustrated 
with their respective positions on several important specific issues. 
One of the most indicative items in the study was the question, 
"What is a Scientist?" The responses fell readily into five categories, 
1. definition by motive, as being curious, love of truth, etc., 2. defi-
nitions by the type of activity, as doing research, solving problems, 
etc., 3. definitions by committment or dedication, 4. definitions by 
the use of the scientific method, stressing objectivity, systematic in-
vestigation, etc., and 5. definitions by training or qualification. With 
only one exception, the SLA scientists defined the scientist in terms 
of motive or by type of activity while one-third of those in the Medi-
cal School defined the scientist by "commitment," by the use of the 
scientific method, or by training and qualification. It is argued here 
that both the conception of the scientist as one who wants to discover 
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knowledge, and as one who investigates nature are essentially con-
ceptions of the scientist as an intellectual. Definitions by method, com-
mitment, and training, assimilate him to a more general model of 
the professional. If this argument be granted, the tendency of the 
Medical School scientists to define the scientist in generalized profes-
sional terms rather than strictly intellectual terms also supports the 
thesis of this paper. 
One of the central dilemmas of every successful scientist is the 
decision to accept or reject a promotion to an administrative posi-
tion. The acceptance of an administrative position was almost univer-
sally acknowledged as meaning the sacrifice, and perhaps the aban-
donment of research interests. Of those who do not already have 
administrative positions, over 80% of those both in SLA and the 
basic sciences in the Medical School would refuse an administrative 
position. Only a little over 40 % of those in clinical medicine would 
do so. (X2 = 7.4, significant at .01 with 1 d.f.) 
Another central factor in the scientific career is the character of 
long range goals and aspirations. If a scientist is essentially an intel-
lectual his chief goal might well be to solve a given theoretical prob-
lem, or to make an important discovery. From another point of view, 
it might be to gain or to preserve his freedom of opportunity to do 
research. Non-intellectual aspirations might be to make a practical 
discovery, to obtain an administrative position, perhaps a department 
chairmanship, or might even be non-professional altogether, as in the 
case of retirement. Table 2 shows that 90 % of the physical and bio-
logical scientists and 84% of the basic medical scientists, but only 
50% of the clinical medical scientists have intellectual aspirations. 
(X2 = 4.1, significant at the .05 confidence level). 
TABLE 2. The Chief Professional Aspirations of University Scientists 
Theoretical Freedom of Non-Intel-
Research lectual Total 
S.L.A. % 45 45 9 99 
No. 10 10 2 22 
Med. Sch., % 52 32 16 100 
Basic No. 13 8 4 25 
Med. Sch., % 25 25 50 100 
Clinical No. 5 5 10 20 
Total % 42 34 24 100 
No. 28 23 16 67 
In sum, all three of the issues selected for illustration - the ten-
dency to have an intellectual rather than professional conception of 
the scientific role, the tendency to reject the opportunity for an ad-
ministrative position, and having specifically intellectual long range 
aspirations, are less characteristic of the scientists in the Medical 
School, (particularly of the clinical scientists), than of the physical 
and biological scientists in SLA. 
Summary: A series of writers have seen the changes occurring in 
the contemporary conceptions of science and have focused on one or 
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another aspect of this same general process. Merle Tuve presents 
the change as the replacement of quiet investigation by individual 
scholars by large scale and highly instrumented research projects. 
C. Wright Mills sees the free intellectual as critic and creator being 
replaced by the hired professional as the servant of and apologist for 
the institution. William H. Whyte feels that as the scientist is drawn 
into the large scale organization the sterile conformity, already char-
acteristic of the world of big business, will be characteristic of science. 
J. D. Bernal focused his attention explicitly on the implications of 
the support of science by the practical institutions of society. He ar-
gues that this can only result in the use of science for their own nar-
row ends, the loss of the concept of knowledge as a value in itself 
and the consequent loss of the capacity of science for a broad scale 
and autonomous development. 
Historically, the individual scientist, both as amateur and as aca-
demic, has conducted his research for his own private satisfactions 
and has justified it by the value of knowledge for its own sake. How-
ever, when the scientist comes into the employ of the practical insti-
tutions, his work becomes subject to the requirements of the institu-
tion and is limited in some way by its purposes. In this situation the 
traditional scheme of science must be displaced for another and more 
compatible one. 
This displacement was hypothesized to occur in three ways. 1. The 
justification of research by the value of knowledge would give way to 
that of utility. 2. The conception of the scientist as an intellectual 
would be assimilated to the general model of the professional. 3. The 
conception of research as being properly conducted by individual 
investigators would be replaced by the model of the organized re-
search team. Eight scales were developed as measures of the changes 
on these three major dimensions. 
Three groups of university scientists were isolated under the expec-
tation that they would display differential portraits with respect to 
these changes. It was expected that the SLA scientists would repre-
sent the nearest counterpart to the old type amateur. The clinical 
medical scientists were expected to show the greatest displacement 
toward institutional conceptions. The basic medical scientists were 
expected to fall between the other two. 
With the exception of one scale the predicted portraits were com-
pletely borne out when tested by the three types of scales. The posi-
tions taken by the three groups on the specific issues of the definition 
of the scientist, the acceptance or rejection of an administrative posi-
tion and the content of their chief professional aspirations were also 
in congruence with the predicted portraits. 
The thesis defended here is that the change to a utilitarian and 
technological conception of science and the assimilation of the role of 
the scientist, previously conceived as that of the free intellectual, to 
the generalized type of the professional employed for his specific 
abilities and knowledge are related to the attachment of science to 
practical institutions. When science remains anchored in the academy, 
unattached to professional training or to other practical ends, the 
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definition of science as part of the world of knowledge of value in 
itself and of the scientist as a free intellectual tends to remain in its 
traditional form. 
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